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The Meaning of Restriction of Competition
Under the Monopolistic Agreements Provisions
of the PRC Anti-Monopoly Law
Thomas K. CHENG*
International attention on the People's Republic of China PRC Anti-Monopoly Law
(AML) has mostly focused on merger control and abuse of dominance. Enforcement against
restrictive agreements and concerted practice seems to have been overlooked so far. This article
examines how the Chinese courts and enforcement authorities have analysed restrictive
agreements. Specifically, it focuses on how the courts and the authorities have applied the
concept of restriction of competition in monopolistic agreement cases. With respect to
horizontal cases, one largely unanswered question is whether anticompetitive effects need to
be proved even in cartel cases or a proof of the mere existence of the agreement suffices. With
respect to vertical cases, there remains much confusion as to the appropriate analytical
framework for resale price maintenance (RPM), the per se rule or the Rule of Reason,
and whether Article 14 of the AML applies to agreements beyond RPM. This article
attempts to shed light on these important questions.
1 INTRODUCTION
Despite its relatively short history, the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) has
achieved global prominence, especially in the arena of merger control, where it is
widely viewed as the third most important jurisdiction from which to secure
approval after the US and the EU. Much has been said about how the prevailing
Chinese approach to merger control is not always consistent with the international
mainstream and how at times non-competition concerns have driven the analysis.1
Chinese enforcement of abuse of dominance has also attracted similar attention and
criticisms with the recent Qualcomm decision, in which the company was fined
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RMB 6 billion (approximately EUR 816 million) for its licensing practices.2
Meanwhile, Chinese regulation of restrictive agreements, known as monopolistic
agreements under the AML, has managed to escape similar scrutiny.3 It is worth
examining whether the Chinese approach to monopolistic agreements, and its
understanding and application of the concept of restriction of competition,
which underpins analysis of restrictive agreements, shows any obvious differences
from the approaches in other major jurisdictions. This article will attempt to
address this question for both horizontal and vertical agreements with reference
to both judicial opinions and public enforcement decisions.
2 RELEVANT LAWS
The relevant provisions in the AML governing the legality of agreements are
Articles 13 to 15.4 Article 13 is concerned with horizontal agreements, while
Article 14 focuses on vertical agreements.5 Meanwhile, Article 15 enumerates
the admissible justifications for agreements deemed to be monopolistic under
Articles 13 and 14.6 One of the questions left open by the language of Articles
13 and 14 is whether an agreement that falls within the literal description of one of
the enumerated categories is automatically deemed to be monopolistic and hence
illegal, or whether it still needs to be shown that the agreement restricts or
eliminates competition. It was understood early on that the enforcement autho-
rities, namely the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and
the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), would issue regula-
tions and guidelines, which will hopefully shed more light on the scope of the
prohibitions under Articles 13 and 14. The regulations that were eventually issued
by the NDRC and the SAIC would fail to meet these expectations.7
The AML is not the only legislation applicable to potentially anticompetitive
practices. There are two other statutes that also apply to such practices – the Price
2 Thomas K. Cheng, The PRC NDRC Case Against Qualcomm: A Misguided Venture or Justified
Enforcement of Competition Law?, 5(1) J. Antitrust Enforcement 76–99 (2017).
3 But see Yichen Yang, Price Related Cartels Under the Chinese Antimonopoly Law Regime: The Need to
Clarify Four Substantive and Procedural Issues, 39(3) World Competition 479–512 (2016).
4 Fan longduan fa [Anti-Monopoly Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
30 Aug. 2007, effective 1 Aug. 2008) 2007 Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Gaz.517(P.R.C.).
5 Ibid., at Arts 13–14.
6 Ibid., at Art. 15.
7 反價格壟斷規定 [Regulations on the Prohibition of Price Monopoly] (promulgated by NDRC Price
Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau, 29 Dec. 2010, effective 1 Feb. 2011) (P.R.C.), http://jjs.
ndrc.gov.cn/zcfg/201101/t20110104_389399.html (accessed 31 Jan. 2017); 工商行政管理机关禁止
垄断协议行为的规定[Regulations on the Prohibition of Monopolistic Agreements by the
Administration of Industry and Commerce] (promulgated by SAIC Anti-Monopoly and Anti-
Unfair Competition Enforcement Bureau, 31 Dec. 2010, effective 1 Feb. 2011) (P.R.C.), http://
www.saic.gov.cn/zcfg/xzgzjgfxwj/fgs/201101/t20110107_103375.html.
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Law of 1997 and the Law Against Unfair Competition (LAUC) of 1993 (often
known as the Anti-Unfair Competition Law).8 During the drafting and the
deliberation of the AML, there were suggestions that provisions in the Price Law
and the LAUC that may overlap with the functions of the AML be repealed.9 The
idea was that it could help avoid duplication and unnecessary confusion, lest
different standards for the same conduct are developed under different laws. In
the end, a decision was made against repeal. Fortunately, the fear of confusion and
inconsistent legal standards did not come to pass. The LAUC is largely no longer
invoked by the enforcement authorities and civil litigants against potentially antic-
ompetitive conduct. While the Price Law has been used by the NDRC and its
local Price Bureaus, it was usually used in cases in which the conduct began before
the AML was adopted.10 Thus the enforcement authorities had no choice but to
invoke the Price Law. In any case, the AML and the Price Law were invoked
concurrently to the extent possible, and were applied to price fixing in most
instances, which is clearly prohibited by both laws. Therefore, the issue of incon-
sistent standards has not arisen.
3 THE MEANING OF RESTRICTION OF COMPETITION
IN HORIZONTAL AGREEMENT CASES
Given the bareness of the statutory language, a fuller understanding of the meaning
of restriction of competition must be gleaned from the decisional practices of the
enforcement authorities and from the case law.
The distribution of cases handled between the courts and the enforcement
authorities has shifted over the years. In the initial two to three years of enforce-
ment of the AML, agency enforcement was relatively subdued. For example, the
NDRC did not issue its first enforcement decision until 2010.11 Meanwhile, civil
8 Jiage Fa [Price Law] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 29 Dec. 1997, effective
1 May 1998) 1997 Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Gaz. (P.R.C.), http://www.npc.gov.cn/
wxzl/gongbao/1997-12/29/content_1480187.htm; Fan buzhengdang jingzheng fa [Law Against
Unfair Competition] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 2 Sept. 1993,
effective 1 Dec. 1993) 1993 Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Gaz. (P.R.C.), http://www.npc.
gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2000-12/05/content_5004600.htm.
9 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Governance in China 365 (2005).
10 南宁、柳州部分米粉生产厂家串通涨价受到严厉查处 [Nanning, Liuzhou Vermicelli Producers
Fined for Price Fixing] (Guangxi Province Price Bureau, 31 Mar. 2010) (P.R.C.), http://jjs.ndrc.
gov.cn/fjgld/201003/t20100331_338262.html; 浙江省富阳市造纸行业协会组织经营者达成价格
垄断协议受到严厉处罚 [Fuyang Paper Manufacturer Trade Association Punished for Price Fixing]
(Zhejiang Province Price Bureau, 4 Jan. 2011) (P.R.C.), http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201101/
t20110104_389453.html; 广东查处海砂价格垄断案件 确保国家重点工程建设顺利进行
[Guangdong Sea Sand Producers Punished for Price Monopoly] (Guangdong Province Price
Bureau, 26 Oct. 2012), http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201210/t20121026_510834.html.
11 See Nanning Vermicelli Price Fixing case, supra n. 10.
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litigants spared no time in taking advantage of the new legislation and AML cases
were filed with the Chinese courts on the day the AML came into effect.12 While
the number of court cases has remained relatively steady over the years, the
enforcement authorities have become considerably more active in recent years.
In 2014 alone, the NDRC and its subordinate Price Bureaus imposed fines
totalling RMB 1.8 billion in sectors such as automobile spare parts, insurance,
cement, and optical lens. The SAIC and its provincial counterparts have initiated
investigation in forty-seven cases between 2008 and 2014, with fifteen initiated in
2014.13 Thus the uptake is quite apparent. However, this intensified enforcement
has not shed greater light on the meaning of restriction of competition. This is
largely because the NDRC and SAIC and their provincial counterparts usually
only issue very brief decisions in cases, if at all. Oftentimes only a press release
outlining the investigation and the infringement is available. These decisions and
press releases do not present detailed analysis of competitive effects. They mostly
only contain a few perfunctory statements about harm to consumers and higher
prices.
In contrast, the court cases are usually much more detailed and offer much
more elaborate analysis. Therefore, the analysis below will begin and focus on the
court cases, followed by an exposition of the decisions by the enforcement
authorities. The important Ruibang v. Johnson & Johnson opinion by the Shanghai
High People’s Court runs into tens of pages and offers very meticulous analysis.
The problem, however, is that many of the private AML cases tend to be abuse of
dominance cases, while agency enforcement action has disproportionately focused
on price fixing. There have been only a handful of court cases involving mono-
polistic agreements. This could be because without the evidence gathering powers
of the enforcement authorities, it is very difficult for a private litigant to obtain
evidence about a cartel. The one exception is cartel conduct by trade associations,
which is common in China and the trade associations tend to be quite open about
their behaviour. Evidence gathering is therefore usually not an issue. Additionally,
in many trade association cases, it was one member suing another over enforce-
ment of the cartel agreement. Parties to the agreement have no difficulty furnishing
evidence on the existence of the cartel. Meanwhile, evidence gathering is usually
less problematic in abuse of dominance and vertical agreements cases. The follow-
ing analysis hence will be based on private cases involving monopolistic agreements
supplemented by the decisional practices of the NDRC and the SAIC.
12 Li Fangping v. China Netcom, Chinalawinfo.com, (Beijing Interm. People’s Ct. No. 1, 18 Dec. 2009).
13 Michael Han & David Boyle, Antitrust Developments in the PRC in 2014, 2 Competition Pol’y Int’l
(2014), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Antitrust-Developments-in-the-
PRC-in-2014.pdf.
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3.1 RESTRICTION OF COMPETITION IN HORIZONTAL AGREEMENT CASES DECIDED
BY THE COURTS
3.1[a] Prelude: A Pre-AML Case
One of the earlier cases involving a horizontal agreement actually predates the
AML. It was the Beijing Locksmith case, which was decided under the LAUC.14
Even though it was decided under the LAUC, the Beijing court applied an
informed competitive effects analysis focusing on market power. The court
invoked language that was reminiscent of competition law. However, the court
did commit the mistake of confusing single-firm dominance and elimination of
competition by an agreement, equating the two concepts.
The case concerned a number of firms providing locksmith service and a
telephone directory service company. What transpired was that the locksmith
service firms contracted with a company to provide a hotline, and the hotline
service provider proceeded to sign an exclusive dealing agreement with a tele-
phone directory service provider, which promised that all incoming calls asking for
a locksmith referral will be transferred to that hotline.15 According to the opinion,
telephone directory inquiries are the main source of business for locksmiths.16 And
after this arrangement became operational, the telephone directory service provider
terminated a similar existing arrangement with two other locksmith firms, which
consequently suffered significant loss of business.17 The two firms brought suit,
arguing that the whole arrangement among all the parties involved restricted
competition and was hence illegal under the LAUC.18
The court began its analysis by defining monopolization, which from sub-
sequent language seems to be intended by the court to refer to restriction of
competition by an agreement.19 The court said monopolization refers to when a
legal entity or legal entities, through unilateral or concerted conduct, obtain or
maintain a controlling position in the market, thereby restricting other compe-
titors from entering the market.20 The court in turn defined a controlling
position as a situation in which a firm possesses the economic capability to
restrict or prevent effective competition in a relevant market.21 The court
proceeded to define the issue in the case as whether the aforementioned
14 Beijing Anjiu Locksmith Co. Ltd. v. Beijing Telecom Co. et al., Westlaw, (Beijing Interm. People’s Ct.
No. 1, 6 Oct. 2004).
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
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arrangement among the locksmith firms, the hotline service provider, and the
telephone directory service provider restricts competition and excludes
competitors.22
Even though the court mentioned the relevant market a number of times, it
did not define it. However, the court proceeded to assess the market power of the
various participants in the arrangement.23 The court observed that with the
liberalization of the Chinese telecom market and the entry of new players, the
114 telephone directory service provided by one of the defendants no longer held
a dominant position.24 The court continued by asserting that the exclusivity
agreement between the telephone directory service provider and the hotline
service provider did not restrict competition either because locksmith inquiries
would only be directed to the hotline if they were open-ended, meaning that the
caller did not specify a locksmith.25 The plaintiffs would continue to get business
from callers who specifically looked for them.26 The court added that the plaintiffs
always had the option of joining the hotline service, which was open to other
locksmith firms and the plaintiffs provided no evidence that they attempted to join
the service but were refused.27 The court concluded the analysis by pointing out
that telephone directory service is but one source of business for locksmiths.28
There were opportunities for the development of other avenues of information
that would provide business to locksmiths. Therefore, the arrangement did not
restrict competition.29
Even though the court’s analysis was by no means faultless – it did overlook
actual evidence that the plaintiffs’ business suffered greatly as a result of the
arrangement – it was methodical in the way it examined the arrangement layer
by layer and analysed competitive alternatives for the plaintiffs. Its implicit premise
was that the presence of alternatives meant that competition was not foreclosed.
The plaintiffs could still thrive, at least in theory, despite the arrangement. The
court’s examination of competitive alternatives perhaps could have been more
thorough. It could have looked into the proportion of calls into telephone
directory services that were open-ended and the proportion of a typical locksmith’s
business accounted for by referrals from telephone directory. Nonetheless, the
Beijing court did a credible job of the analysis, especially considering the level of
awareness of competition law in China at the time – the AML had not even been
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
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passed. The difference is particularly stark when one compares the Beijing court’s
analysis with that contained in the agencies’ subsequent enforcement decisions.
3.1[b] Cases Under the AML
This author has managed to locate eight court cases decided under the AML or in
which the legality of an agreement under the AML was implicated. All of them
involved cartel conduct; thus far there does not seem to have been any non-cartel
horizontal agreement court cases in China. Six of them featured trade associations.
Trade associations are a very regular culprit in the cartel cases, both in public
enforcement and civil litigation. This is in a way a positive development as the
Chinese trade associations tend to be quite open about their price fixing endea-
vours. This renders detection much easier than in typical secretive cartel cases that
are seen in other jurisdictions.
In terms of analysis of the jurisprudential development, there are two main
lines of inquiry. The first one is how the courts have interpreted and applied the
concept of restriction of competition to determine whether an agreement infringes
Article 13 of the AML. With respect to the meaning of restriction of competition,
the overriding question over which the courts presiding over the cases have
differed is whether there is any need to prove restrictive effects when a cartel is
alleged. In other words, whether an effects analysis is necessary for cartel agree-
ments. The overwhelming consensus seems to be that such an analysis is unneces-
sary for cartel agreements. All but two courts have summarily condemned cartel
agreements absent a detailed investigation of competitive effects. The main anom-
aly are the two courts in the Shenzhen Pest Control case, both of which insisted on
an assessment of market power, hinting that even a cartel agreement is unlikely to
harm competition without market power on the part of the participants. In this
sense, the two courts seem to be of the view that falling within one of the six
enumerated conduct in Article 13 of the AML does not result in an automatic
infringement. They seem to take the proviso at the end of Article 13 that
monopolistic agreements are agreements that restrict or eliminate competition as
a required element of proof in every AML agreements case.
The second line of inquiry is how the courts have reacted to and handled
possible defences and justifications for a putatively anticompetitive agreement.
Defendants in these cartel cases have attempted to offer a variety of defences for
their agreements, ranging from the argument that the agreement resulted in
reasonable prices to that collusion is necessary to maintain quality or safeguard
public health. With the exception of two cases, the Chinese courts have generally
exhibited a hostile attitude toward justifications for these attempts to justify cartel
conduct.
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3.1[b][i] Restriction of Competition
A majority of the Chinese courts have concluded that cartel agreements require no
elaborate effects analysis. These include the Suzhou Construction Materials case, the
Nanjing Concrete case, the Beijing Scallops case, the Chenzhou Construction Waste
Transport case, and the Xinjiang Brickmaker case. The conduct covered includes
price fixing, market allocation, bid rigging, group boycott, and no-poach agree-
ments. The Courts’ analysis does not seem to differ much by the type of agree-
ment. Hardcore cartel conduct seems to be treated the same way regardless of its
precise form.
The Suzhou Construction Materials case, which is the first court case concerning
a monopolistic agreement this author is able to locate, concerns an agreement
between two construction materials companies in Nantong in the Jiangsu Province
in eastern China.30 The agreement is a catalogue of hardcore cartel offenses; in it
the parties agreed to fix prices, to allocate markets, and to rig bids.31 In addition,
they also agreed not to hire management personnel and production workers from
each other.32 The dispute arose when one party discovered that the other party had
entered into a sales contract in contravention of the cartel agreement.33 The
aggrieved party brought suit to enforce the agreement, which was nullified by
the court on the grounds that it contravened the AML.34 On appeal, the Nantong
Intermediate People’s Court upheld the lower court’s decision.35
The Nantong court began by stating that there are two questions to consider
when determining the existence of a monopolistic agreement: (1) whether there is
a competitive relationship between the two parties, and (2) whether the agreement
restricts or eliminates competition.36 The first question did not detain the court for
long as the parties were direct competitors.37 The court proceeded to define
horizontal price fixing as an agreement between competitors to fix prices through
whatever means.38 The court declared that price competition is the most funda-
mental and basic kind of competition and that price fixing is a serious antic-
ompetitive conduct inflicting the greatest harm on competition and is
detrimental to consumer welfare.39 It is noteworthy that the court did not inquire
30 Suzhou Jvxing Light Construction Materials Co. v. Nantong Feilun Light Construction Materials Co.,
Chinalawinfo.com, (Nantong Interm. People’s Court, 2010).
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
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into whether the price fixing arrangement had had any impact on the market price.
It was illegal because it eliminated price competition between the two parties.
The court equally swiftly condemned the market sharing and the bid rigging
arrangements. The court noted that even though the market sharing arrangement
did not eliminate or restrict competition from other firms, it violates Article 13 of
the AML because it restricts free competition between the two parties.40 Thus it is
clear that market-wide impact is not required. Elimination of competition between
the two firms sufficed. The court also struck down the bid rigging arrangement on
the ground that it eliminated and restricted competition between the two firms.41
Again, no further proof of impact on competition in general is necessary. Lastly, it
is worth noting that the appellant made the perhaps risible argument that the cartel
agreement between itself and the appellee was in fact a joint venture aimed at
independent profit maximization.42 This argument provided the court with an
opportunity to clarify the boundary between a legitimate joint venture and an
illegal cartel agreement. After all, the agreement did provide for joint bidding by
the two parties in some circumstances and thus the argument was not completely
groundless. However, the court declined the invitation and simply ignored the
argument.
The same analytical approach continues to be adopted in the Nanjing Concrete
case.43 This case in fact emanated from public enforcement by the Price Bureau of
the Jiangsu Province. What subsequently transpired was rather unusual in a
Chinese public enforcement case. The Jiangsu Price Bureau had fined the
Nanjing Concrete Association and a few other concrete companies for price
fixing.44 The trade association and at least one of the firms had at one point
initiated administrative litigation to review the Price Bureau’s decision, but sub-
sequently abandoned the suit.45 Even then, the parties refused to pay the fine and
the Jiangsu Price Bureau initiated court proceedings to compel the parties to pay.46
It is very rare for parties to seek administrative review of a decision by one of the
enforcement authorities, even though it was aborted eventually. Nor is it common
for parties to refuse to pay a fine and for the enforcement authority to seek judicial
assistance to collect it. In a very short decision affirming the fine on the trade
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Jiangsu Province Price Bureau v. Nanjing Concrete Association, Judicial Opinions of China, (Nanjing
Interm. People’s Court, 13 Aug. 2014); Jiangsu Province Price Bureau v. Nanjing Jiahao New
Construction Materials Co., Judicial Opinions of China, (Nanjing Interm. People’s Court, 13 Aug.
2014); Jiangsu Province Price Bureau v. Nanjing Dadi Concrete Co. Ltd., Judicial Opinions of China,
(Nanjing Interm. People’s Court, 7 Nov. 2014).
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
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association, the court noted that the fact that members of the association had
reached agreement on price at its meetings was sufficient to sustain a finding of a
monopolistic agreement under the AML.47 This is despite two defences pled by
the trade association, which will be discussed in the subsequent section.
The Beijing Scallops case adopted the same analytical approach, albeit with
slightly more elaboration.48 In that case, the Beijing Fisheries Wholesale
Association had adopted a handbook that provided that failure to sell products at
prices stipulated by the association would be considered unfair competition and
would result in a fine.49 In addition, the association had agreed not to sell scallops
in whole pieces to non-members that competed with members in the same seafood
market (this apparently would make it more difficult and costly for the non-
members to resell the scallops).50 The plaintiff was an owner of a seafood retail
business that had been fined on a number of occasions by the association for failure
to abide by the stipulated prices and eventually left the association.51 It brought suit
to nullify the provisions in the handbook that allowed the association to punish
members for failure to follow the stipulated prices and to seek damages.52
The Beijing Intermediate People’s Court No. 2 held that the price fixing and
the group boycott agreements were monopolistic agreements in violation of the
AML.53 In striking down the price fixing agreement, the court stated that the
agreement was intended to prevent competition among members of the association
and affect the normal fluctuation of prices, thereby raising the members’ profit.54
Without citing any evidence, the court proceeded to assert that the agreement
produced the objective effect of restricting competition.55 This is slightly different
from the approach taken by the court in the Nanjing Concrete case, which con-
cluded that the fact that the parties had agreed to fix prices was sufficient to support
a finding of a monopolistic agreement. In the Beijing Scallops case, the court took a
step further and made reference to the effects of the agreement. However, this is to
be distinguished from the evidence of restriction of competition required in the
Shenzhen Pest Control case – to be discussed below – where the courts demanded
concrete evidence of price increase or quality reduction. The kind of objective
effects referred to by the Beijing Intermediate People’s Court – prevention of
47 Ibid.
48 Beijing Fisheries Wholesale Association v. Lei Binglin, Judicial Opinions of China, (Beijing High People’s
Court, 9 Apr. 2014).
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
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competition between competitors and limitation of the fluctuation of price – are
the necessary consequence of every price fixing agreement. The court in effect did
not seem to be requiring much more than the proof of a price fixing agreement to
find a contravention.
The Beijing court also held the group boycott arrangement to be a monopolistic
agreement under the AML. Even though concerted refusal to trade is expressly
prohibited under Article 13(5) of the AML, the court did not condemn the group
boycott in the case outright.56 Instead, the court linked the group boycott to the
price fixing agreement, and characterizing it as a mechanism to enhance the effec-
tiveness of the price fixing agreement by limiting competition from the non-
members.57 If the non-members had been able to obtain whole scallops, they
would have been able to compete with the members and possibly undercut the
prices set by the association.58 The court further noted that if the non-members had
been able to obtain the whole scallops from the members, the incentives of the
former to join the association would be reduced, thereby allowing them to continue
to operate outside of the association and free from the price constraints imposed by
the association.59 Thus between these three cases, the Chinese courts have summa-
rily condemned practically every type of cartel agreement.
Finally, there were three cases, the Chenzhou Construction Waste Transport
case,60 the Xinjiang Brickmaker case,61 the Longxi Concrete case,62 in which the
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Yunfa Construction Waste Transport Company and Xinjun Construction Waste Transport Company
v. Longsheng Construction Waste Transport Company, itslaw.com, (Chenzhou Intermediate People’s
Court, 30 May 2015). In this case, the Chenzhou Intermediate People’s Court was confronted with
the question of the enforceability of a cartel agreement between the only four authorized construction
waste transporters in Chenzhou in Hunan Province. The four transporters had entered into a cartel
agreement under the rubric of a trade association. Under the agreement, the four companies agreed to
take on all projects together, fix a minimum price for their service, and share profits among themselves.
One of the parties breached the agreement and accepted a construction waste removal project on its
own. The remaining parties brought suit over the breach of contract. Again, in summary fashion, the
Court concluded that the agreement restricted and eliminated competition and was in violation of the
AML. The agreement was therefore null and void. The only elaboration the Court provided on how
the agreement restricted competition was that it was detrimental to fair competition, market order and
the healthy and sustainable development of the industry. In no way did the Court explore concrete
evidence of anticompetitive effects in the market.
61 Qv Chuanyu v. Sun Fudong et. al., itslaw.com, (Fuhai County People’s Court, 15 Dec. 2015). In this
case, the Court invalidated a subcontracting agreement on the grounds that the agreement amounted
to output restriction and hence contravened the AML. Again, the Court was able to reach this
conclusion without any elaborate analysis of competitive effects. It readily concluded that output
restriction would result in the stabilization of or increase in prices for red bricks.
62 Longxi Yufang Concrete Mixing Company vs. Longxi Concrete Trade Association, Judicial Opinions of
China, (Xuancheng Intermediate People’s Court, 28 Sept. 2015). In this case, the Court similarly
invalidated a market allocation agreement which required members of a concrete manufacturer
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Court was asked to determine the enforceability of an agreement in light of its
incompatibility with the AML. The detailed facts of the cases need not detain us.
Suffice it to say that all three cases were concerned with the enforceability of a
cartel agreement. In all three cases, the Courts were able to reach their conclusion
invalidating the agreement without an elaborate effects analysis.
In a case that stands out in its approach to cartel agreements, the Guangdong
High People’s Court upheld a price fixing agreement by the Shenzhen Pest
Control Association.63 In this case, the Shenzhen Pest Control Association and
its members had reached the ‘Shenzhen Pest Control Service Integrity Self-
Discipline Pact’, in which the members agreed that any member which tendered
service at less than 80% of the recommended price announced by an official body
in 1997 would be deemed to have engaged in unfair competition.64 Offenders can
be subject to a range of penalties, including disqualification from the provision of
service.65 The plaintiff was a customer of one of the member companies.66 It
argued that it had overpaid for pest control service as a result of the price fixing
agreement.67
At trial, the Shenzhen Intermediate People’s Court upheld the price fixing
agreement on various grounds, most of which focus on the limited restrictive
effects of the agreement. First and foremost, the court concluded that the effect on
competition of the agreement was limited due to the moderate market share of its
members.68 After defining the relevant product market as pest control and the
relevant geographic market as Shenzhen, the court ascertained the market share of
the association’s members as 32%.69 Given this market share, and the fact that there
were similar trade associations as the Shenzhen Pest Control Association in the
city, the effect on competition of the price fixing agreement would be limited. The
court also defended the price fixing agreement on the ground that it did not fix a
price; the price could still fluctuate within the confines of the minimum price.70
This is an argument that had been roundly rejected in other jurisdictions, such as
association to pay a deposit to the association to ensure compliance with the allocation scheme. The
deposit was calibrated based on the members’ allocated market share. After the agreement was
terminated, the association returned the deposit to all but one member, which then sued for its
deposit. The Xuancheng Intermediate People’s Court ordered the return of the deposit on the ground
that the agreement was invalid. The Court did not discuss the competitive effects of the agreement and
simply asserted the illegality of the market allocation provisions.
63 Shenzhen Huierxun Tech. Co. Ltd. v. Shenzhen Pest Control Association, China IPR Judgments &
Decisions, The PRC Supreme People’s Court (Guangdong High People’s Court, July 2012).
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
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the US in the Socony-Vacuum Oil case.71 In a move that could prove to be highly
problematic for future plaintiffs in cartel cases, the court held that the plaintiff is
expected to come forward with evidence that the price fixing agreement produced
restrictive effects on competition, such as evidence that the number of pest control
service providers had decreased, the price of pest control service had risen or the
quality of pest control service had fallen.72 This directly contradicts the courts in
the Suzhou Construction Materials case and the Nanjing Concrete case, which held that
in cartel cases, there is no need to define the relevant market and to provide
evidence of restrictive effects on competition.
Unfortunately for the development of competition law in China, the
Guangdong High People’s Court endorsed practically all the conclusions of the
Shenzhen court and upheld the decision.73 The Guangdong court agreed with the
Shenzhen court that the price mechanism in the relevant market had not been
severely distorted as the price was not completely fixed, but could fluctuate to a
fairly substantial extent.74 The Guangdong court concurred with the Shenzhen
court that there is a need to show restriction of competition even in a price fixing
case.75 The Guangdong court actually reached a lower market share percentage for
members of the association, at 22.31%, and again concluded that the impact on
competition was limited.76 The court reiterated that there was no direct evidence
of restriction of competition in the form of exclusion of competitors outside the
price fixing arrangement, increase in price, or deterioration in quality.77
In a case that was arguably even more misguided than the Shenzhen Pest
Control case, the Enshi Miao Autonomous Region Intermediate People’s Court
upheld a cartel agreement on the ground that it prevented vicious competition. In
the Badong Shenlong Travel Agencies case,78 the Court was asked to determine the
legality and hence validity of an agreement among travel agencies in a trade
association to fix prices, adopt common service standards, and centralize promo-
tion. While acknowledging that the agreement fixed prices, the Court upheld it on
the ground that it was beneficial to the healthy development of an operating
environment.79 The Court suggested that allowing the member agencies to adjust
their prices independently would result in vicious competition.80 At least the
71 US v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 US 150 (1940).
72 Shenzhen Pest Control case, supra n. 63.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Badong County Sanxia International Travel Agency v. Badong Shenlongxi International Travel Agency, itslaw.
com, (Enshi Miao Autonomous Region Intermediate People’s Court, 17 Dec. 2015).
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
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Shenzhen and Guangdong courts accepted that price fixing harmed competition;
they only required proof that the agreement at issue had restrictive effects. The
Enshi court worryingly endorsed the idea that free competition was detrimental to
market order and price fixing was the antidote for unfettered competition.81
Furthermore, it did not require price fixing to be justified by social welfare
considerations. It simply accepted that the very effect of price fixing was beneficial
to the orderly development of the market.82 One sincerely hopes that this case
represents an anomaly and does not represent the views of most Chinese courts.
3.1[b][ii] Defences
The Chinese courts were confronted with a variety of justifications and defences
for cartel agreements. Some of them were premised on the notion that the
agreement did not seriously restrict competition, while some others were based
on purported benefits from the suppression of competition. The courts were
mostly hostile towards them. However, the courts in the Shenzhen Pest Control
case unfortunately adopted a sympathetic attitude towards some defences that
could have far-reaching implications if a similar attitude were to be adopted by
future courts.
In the Suzhou Construction Materials case, the appellant put forward an argu-
ment that was reminiscent of those often advanced in the early US price fixing
cases, which is that price fixing should be legal if the agreed-upon price is
reasonable.83 The court firmly rejected the argument, noting that even though
the agreement only fixed a minimum price, the price should be above that set by
the least efficient operator in the market.84 In a response that is also reminiscent of
that made by the US courts in the early antitrust cases, the Nantong court further
noted that there is no other benchmark for determining the reasonableness of price
than competition itself.85 Because the agreement fixed prices, it is certainly possible
to conclude that the agreed-upon price is unreasonable. The court also rejected the
argument that the agreement is legal because the price fixing arrangement did not
affect other competitors, arguing that competition with other competitors is
inevitably affected when the two companies fixed prices between each other.86
A slightly different defence was offered in the Beijing Scallops case. The
defendant in that case did not argue that their agreement did not restrict
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 US 290 (1897); United States v. Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d 175 US 211 (1899).
84 Suzhou Constuction Materials case, supra n. 30.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
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competition, or that the price they had set was reasonable, but that it was only
implemented in response to the supplier’s demand.87 Specifically, the association
argued that the price fixing agreement was merely an attempt to implement the
supplier’s decision to fix resale prices.88 Instead of condemning the resale price
maintenance (RPM) scheme as illegal, the Beijing High People’s Court merely
noted that the supplier only stipulated a minimum resale price, and did not require
the seafood wholesalers to fix actual prices.89 One may infer from this treatment of
the defence that RPMs are not illegal per se under the AML, which, as it turns out,
is also the view held by the Shanghai courts, which will be discussed below.
Beyond these are a range of defences in which the defendant attempted to
argue that price fixing was necessary to secure some other benefits, such as better
quality, social welfare, or public benefit. In the Nanjing Concrete case, the defen-
dants argued that concrete is a special material and therefore a minimum price is
necessary to ensure quality.90 This argument did not detain the Court for long and
was rejected summarily. However, the courts in the Shenzhen Pest Control case
demonstrated a markedly different attitude toward similar defences and seemingly
endorsed the argument that price fixing is justified because cut-throat competition
will lead to deterioration in quality.
In that case, the Shenzhen court defended the price fixing agreement on the
basis of social welfare. The court declared that the AML does not espouse pure
price competition at the expense of social welfare.91 Misconstruing the Rule of
Reason, the court proclaimed that the rule for determining the legality of an
alleged monopolistic agreement is the Rule of Reason, even though the agreement
at issue concerned price fixing.92 The court argued that if an agreement between
operators pursues a proper objective, it would escape condemnation even if it
restricts competition among competitors.93 The court proceeded to characterize
pest control as a service of public benefit, arguing that the toxic chemicals used in
pest control could affect public health, the health of the employees of the service
providers, and the environment, and that pest control is closely related to disease
control.94 Furthermore, the recommended price promulgated by the official body
had been in existence for thirteen years, during which labour costs had undergone
significant inflation.95 In light of this low recommended price, if service providers
87 Beijing Scallops case, supra n. 48.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Nanjing Concrete case, supra n. 62.
91 Shenzhen Pest Control case, supra n. 63.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
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offered a price that was substantially below this price, they would struggle to
recoup their labour costs and would be forced to resort to lower quality products,
thereby jeopardizing public health.96 Therefore, the proper objective pursued by
the price fixing agreement was presumably the assurance of quality service and the
protection of public health.
It is not entirely clear what is the significance of the court’s characterization of
pest control as a service of public benefit. In any case, the court’s definition of a
service of public benefit is unduly broad. At most, pest control can only be
characterized as a service with public health implications. The court’s analysis
can be construed as saying that for any product or service that has a public health
dimension, unfettered price competition could lead to a deterioration of quality
and a consequent threat to public health. For these products and services, price
fixing to ensure quality could be justified. Even a narrower reading of the court’s
analysis could suggest that fixing of a price that is sufficiently low that below which
the firms cannot recover their costs and ensure a minimum level of quality would
be permitted under the AML. Both readings would lead to unwelcomed con-
sequences for the prosecution of cartels in China. The court’s view that unfettered
competition would lead to a deterioration of quality is inconsistent with overseas
jurisprudence, for example the US National Society of Professional Engineers case.97
Lastly, in the Nanjing Concrete case, the Nanjing court dealt with a defence that
could have widespread implications in China. This defence concerned to what
extent price fixing is justified by price regulation by government entities. The
defendants argued that the agreed-upon price was below the recommended price
made by the municipal Commission of Housing and Urban-Rural Development
and was therefore justified.98 The local commission apparently had made price
recommendations for concrete.99 The court’s implicit rejection of the defence –
the court did not explicitly address it – is noteworthy because of the prevalence of
price recommendations by Chinese official bodies of various kinds.100 It is not an
entirely meritless argument that a price agreed upon by private parties that is below
what officials have deemed to be appropriate is less problematic. After all, from the
official point of view, anything below the recommended price should be accep-
table. But in a move that will be highly beneficial to AML enforcement and
upholding free competition in China, the court did not deem official price
recommendation as a valid justification for price fixing.
96 Ibid.
97 Nat’l Soc’y Prof’l Engineers v. US, 435 US 679 (1978).
98 Nanjing Concrete case, supra n. 60.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
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3.1[c] Conclusion
Overall, one can conclude from the case law that the Chinese courts generally hold
the view that cartel agreements, such as price fixing, market allocation, and bid
rigging, constitute illegal monopolistic agreements without the need for elaborate
proof of anticompetitive effects. In other words, cartel agreements can be con-
sidered to be illegal per se. The Chinese courts also seem to reject defences for
price fixing such as reasonableness of price and assurance of quality. Despite the
small sample size, thus far one can consider the Shenzhen Pest Control and the
Badong Shenlong Travel Agencies cases to be an anomaly. If that is true, the Chinese
courts’ approach to cartel agreements would be largely consistent with that of the
major jurisdictions. However, a confident conclusion about this will need to await
further judicial decisions.
3.1[d] Supreme People’s Court’s Judicial Interpretations
In May 2012, the Supreme People’s Court issued the Judicial Interpretations Related
to Issues Arising in Civil Litigation under the Anti-Monopoly Law (hereinafter Judicial
Interpretations).101 In Article 7 of the Judicial Interpretations, the Supreme People’s
Court promulgates that if an agreement falls within one of the five enumerated
categories in Article 13, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that
the agreement does not restrict or eliminate competition.102 The Judicial
Interpretations were issued after the Shenzhen Pest Control case was decided and
upheld. It is highly likely that the Shenzhen and Guangdong courts would have
handled the case differently under the Judicial Interpretations. Instead of asking the
plaintiff to provide concrete evidence of actual anticompetitive effects, the courts
would have required the defendant to show the contrary, which the defendant
arguably did with reference to its low market share and the existence of
competitors.
It is not entirely clear how closely the lower courts implement the Judicial
Interpretations. The Beijing Scallops case was decided after the Judicial Interpretations
were issued. However, the Beijing court did not shift the burden of proof in that
case and instead focused on enumerating the anticompetitive effects of the agree-
ment. There was no mention in the judgment whatsoever of the defendant being
asked to adduce evidence of a lack of anticompetitive effects. One question left
101 關於審理因壟斷行為引發的民事糾紛案件應用法律若干問題的規定 [Judicial Interpretations
Related to Issues Arising in Civil Litigation under the Anti-Monopoly Law] (promulgated by the
Supreme People’s Court, 8 May 2012) (P.R.C.), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2012-05-08/
141824384755.shtml.
102 Ibid., at Art. 7.
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open by the Judicial Interpretations is whether in addition to showing a lack of
anticompetitive effects, the defendant would be allowed to proffer justifications for
a monopolistic agreement which are not enumerated in Article 15, such as the
public benefit defence put forward by the Shenzhen and Guangdong courts in the
Shenzhen Pest Control case. In other words, the question is whether the list of
possible justifications for monopolistic agreements under Article 15 is meant to be
exhaustive. How the Judicial Interpretations will affect the Chinese courts’ approach
remains to be seen.
3.2 RESTRICTION OF COMPETITION IN HORIZONTAL AGREEMENT CASES ISSUED
BY THE ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES
A review of the agency decisions in China would seem to endorse the view that
cartels are illegal per se under the AML. It is not always easy to decipher the
analysis undertaken by the agencies when deciding a case as they release very little
information about their analytical approach. Oftentimes they only issue a press
release. Even if they do release a decision, it tends to be relatively short. And
sometimes information is only available through Chinese press reports. However,
from the materials available, it is quite clear that the NDRC and the SAIC do not
believe that a detailed competitive effects analysis is necessary in order to condemn
a cartel. Cartels are generally found to be illegal after establishing their existence.
The NDRC and the SAIC and their local counterparts have issued many
more decisions regarding monopolistic agreements, especially cartels, than the
courts. Again, many of them involved trade associations, and most of them
involved domestic companies only. Foreign companies were fined in a number
of cases, such as the LCD Display case,103 the Automobile Spare Parts and Ball Bearing
case,104 and the Automobile Manufacturers and Dealers case.105 While domestic
companies have featured in the bulk of the cases, foreign companies have been
liable for a disproportionate share of the fines. The LCD display makers were fined
103 六家境外企业实施液晶面板价格垄断被依法查处 [Six Foreign Enterprises Punished for Price
Fixing in LCD Display] (NDRC Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau, 17 Jan. 2013)
(P.R.C.), http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201301/t20130117_523203.html.
104 日本十二家企业实施汽车零部件和轴承价格垄断被国家发展改革委罚款12.35亿元 [Twelve
Japanese Enterprises Fined by NDRC for RMB 1.235 billion for Price Monopoly in Automobile
Spare Parts and Ball Bearing] (NDRC Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly Bureau, 20 Aug. 2014)
(P.R.C.), http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201408/t20140820_622756.html.
105 一汽-大众销售有限责任公司及部分奥迪经销商在湖北省实施价格垄断被查处 [FAW-Volkswagen
and Audi Dealers Punished for Price Monopoly in Hubei Province] (Hubei Province Price Bureau, 11
Sept. 2014) (P.R.C.), http://www.hbpic.gov.cn/chn201201110924533/article.jsp?articleId=45084; 克莱
斯勒及上海地区部分经销商实施价格垄断被依法查处 [Chrysler and Shanghai Dealers Punished for
Price Monopoly] (Shanghai Price Bureau, 11 Sept. 2014) (P.R.C.), http://www.chinadevelopment.com.
cn/qgjgzs/2014/09/691583.shtml.
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RMB 353 million,106 the automobile spare parts and ball bearing manufacturers
RMB 1.23 billion,107 and the automobile manufacturers and dealers RMB 313
million.108 This is a reflection of the fact that the foreign companies that have been
fined were largely major multinational corporations such as Mercedes-Benz and
Samsung, while the punished domestic firms were mostly local or regional firms
engaging in local cartels through trade associations. The turnover of these domestic
firms is necessarily smaller. In only two cases did the fines imposed on the domestic
companies exceed RMB 100 million; in most cases, the fines were no more than
RMB 1 million.
In none of the press releases and decisions released by the NDRC and the
SAIC did the two enforcement authorities describe a detailed competitive effects
analysis. In the early cases, such as the Guangxi Vermicelli case,109 the Fuyang Paper
case,110 and the Guangdong Sea Sand case,111 the releases from the authorities only
outlined the factual background to the price fixing scheme and proceeded to
conclude straight away that there was a violation of the law (some of these earlier
cases implicated the Price Law because the AML had not come into effect when
the conduct took place). In some subsequent cases, there were a few statements
regarding how the cartel arrangement allowed the participants to control prices,
thereby harming the legal rights of other operators and consumers.
In the decisions issued in the Zhejiang Insurance case, which was the first case in
which the NDRC issued a more detailed decision for every firm involved in the
case, there were a few more statements about the competitive effects of the price
fixing scheme.112 The NDRC asserted that the scheme directly eliminated price
competition between the competitors, reduced the operators’ incentives to
improve service quality in order to attract consumers, took away consumers’
right to choose, solidified market shares among competitors, reduced market
efficiency, and harmed consumer welfare.113 However, on none of these effects
did the NDRC provide concrete evidence that it actually materialized. These
seemed to be treated more as the theoretical effects of price fixing in general rather
than what had actually transpired in the case.
In the decisions issued in the Automobile Spare Parts and Ball Bearing case, the
NDRC again recited that the price fixing scheme directly resulted in higher prices
106 LCD Display Manufacturers Fined by NDRC, supra n. 18.
107 Automobile Spare Parts and Ball Bearing Manufacturers Fined by NDRC, supra n. 19.
108 Automobile Manufacturers and Dealers Fined by Hubei and Shanghai Price Bureaus, supra n. 20.
109 Nanning Vermicelli Price Fixing case, supra n. 10.
110 Fuyang Paper Manufacturer Price Fixing case, supra n. 10.
111 Guangdong Sea Sand Producers Price Fixing case, supra n. 10.
112 國家發展和改革委員會行政處罰決定書 [2013] 4, 7-29號 [NDRC Administrative Penalty
Decision [2013] No. 4, 7-29] (NDRC, 30 Dec. 2013), http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/fjgld/index.html.
113 NDRC Administrative Penalty Decision No. 7.
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for the spare parts and indirectly raised the prices for automobile, thereby harming
the welfare of the downstream automobile manufacturers and consumers.114
Again, the NDRC did not adduce concrete evidence that the increase in spare
part prices was passed on to consumers. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that the
enforcement authorities find it sufficient to merely state the theoretical effects of
cartel conduct in order to condemn it. Given that every price fixing scheme carries
the theoretical possibility of raising prices and reducing consumer choice, the
enforcement authorities’ approach is tantamount to a per se rule for cartel conduct.
4 THE MEANING OF RESTRICTION OF COMPETITION
IN VERTICAL AGREEMENT CASES
Most of the vertical agreement cases decided by the courts and the enforcement
authorities have involved RPM. This author’s research yielded three vertical
agreement court cases, two involving vertical territorial allocation and the other
RPM. Meanwhile, there have been a number of high-profile public enforcement
decisions involving RPM, such as the Moutai-Wuliangye case,115 which remains the
case imposing the heftiest fines on domestic firms, the Baby Formula case,116 the
Optical Lens Makers case,117 and the Automobile Manufacturers and Dealers case.
Heavy fines were imposed in all these cases. Two Shanghai courts have expressed
their approval for a Rule of Reason-type analysis for RPMs in the Ruibang
v. Johnson & Johnson case. Meanwhile, from the meagre amount of information
available from the NDRC and its local counterparts, the enforcement authorities
seem to take a more hardline approach to RPMs that borders on the per se rule.
Different rules applied by the authorities and the courts are clearly unsatisfactory as
it may lead to the prospect of forum shopping. If a private party can persuade the
NDRC to take on its case, it is obviously more beneficial to the plaintiff’s cause
when public enforcement is involved, especially when the plaintiff is not primarily
concerned with claiming damages.
114 Automobile Spare Parts and Ball Bearing Manufacturers Fined by NDRC, supra n. 104.
115 五粮液公司实施价格垄断被处罚2.02亿元 [Wuliangye Fined RMB 202 million or Price
Monopoly] (Szechuan DRC, 22 Feb. 2013), http://www.scdrc.gov.cn/dir25/159074.htm; Zhong
Jingjing,茅台、五粮液价格垄断被罚4.49亿 [Moutai, Wuliangye Fined RMB 449 million for Price
Monopoly], (Bjnews, 20 Feb. 2013), http://www.bjnews.com.cn/finance/2013/02/20/248977.html.
116 合生元等乳粉生产企业违反《反垄断法》限制竞争行为共被处罚6.6873亿元 [Biostime and
Other Baby Formula Manufacturers Fined RMB 668 million for Anticompetitive Conduct]
(NDRC, 7 Aug. 2013), http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwzx/xwfb/201308/t20130807_552991.html.
117 部分眼镜镜片生产企业维持转售价格行为被依法查处 [Optical Lens Manufacturers Fined for
Resale Price Maintenance] (NDRC, 29 May 2014), http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwzx/xwfb/201405/
t20140529_613554.html.
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4.1 RESTRICTION OF COMPETITION IN NON-PRICE VERTICAL AGREEMENTS CASES
This author has located three cases in the enforcement record of the AML that
have involved vertical agreements other than RPM, although one of them also
involved a horizontal price fixing element and therefore it was not clear what is the
significance of the exclusive distribution agreements involved in that case.
The Nanjing Alcohol Distribution case involved a vertical territorial distribution
agreement between an alcohol wholesaler and its distributor.118 The wholesaler
had signed an agreement with the distributor to allow the latter to sell some
alcohol products within a designated geographic area.119 The wholesaler had
previously entered into an agreement with the supplier of the products that
required the former to enforce vertical territorial allocation.120 Failure to comply
would result in a fine and forfeiture of rebates.121 The downstream distributor sold
the products outside of its designated territory, which was discovered by the
supplier.122 The supplier proceeded to impose a financial penalty in excess of
RMB 800,000 on the wholesaler.123 The wholesaler sued the distributor for
breach of contract and for the financial loss the former had sustained as a result
of the latter’s conduct.124 The lower court ruled in favour of the wholesaler,
awarding damages. The distributor appealed the decision, arguing that the vertical
territorial allocation arrangement violated the AML.
In somewhat cryptic language, the Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court held
that the vertical territorial allocation arrangement did not violate the AML.125 The
court seemed to have misunderstood the nature of the arrangement. It noted that
Article 13 of the AML applies to agreements between competitors whereas Article
14 concerns agreements between a business operator and its transactional counter-
part, and proceeded to characterize the vertical territorial allocation arrangement as
an agreement between an upstream and a downstream operator on price and the
market, therefore falls outside the prohibition of Articles 13 and 14.126 What the
court essentially said was that Article 14 governed vertical agreements, and the
arrangement at issue was a vertical agreement on price and market allocation, and
therefore was not covered by Article 14. Admittedly, vertical territorial allocation
is not one of the enumerated conduct expressly prohibited by Article 14. But the
118 Cao Yanmei v. Nanjing Yakeqin Trading Co. Ltd., Judicial Opinions of China, (Nanjing Interm. People’s
Court, 23 Sept. 2013).
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
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court’s pronouncement effectively means that vertical agreements are per se legal.
It is not entirely clear based on the court’s understanding, what sort of vertical
agreement would fall within the ambit of Article 14. Whatever the broader
implications of the decision, what is clear is that the Nanjing court deemed vertical
territorial allocation to be legal without any need for a competitive effects analysis.
The Lianyungang Mobile Phone case also implicated a vertical territorial distribu-
tion agreement.127 The case involved an agreement under which the plaintiff
authorized the defendant to be a distributor for a certain brand of mobile phone at
a particular retail location in the city of Lianyungang in Jiangsu Province.128 The
agreement provided for financial penalties on the distributor should he fail to abide
by the territorial restriction imposed on him.129 The distributor was found to have
violated the territorial restriction and the mobile phone supplier sued to recover the
financial penalties stipulated in the distribution agreement.130 The trial court had
invalidated the agreement on the ground that it amounted to market allocation and
was hence illegal under the AML. The Lianyungang Intermediate People’s Court
overturned the lower court’s conclusion, and held that the agreement amounted to
nothing more than the supplier’s attempt to secure orderly distribution of its product
and hence did not restrict competition.131 The Court did not undertake a full
competitive effects analysis to study the impact of the distribution agreement on
the market. In fact, it did not even define the market. It is entirely possible that the
supplier had so little market power that the agreement could not create meaningful
anticompetitive effects. Instead, the Court seemed to premise its conclusion on the
legitimacy of the defence put forward by the plaintiff.132 It seemed to believe that it
was within the supplier’s right to impose territorial restrictions on its distributors.133
The Court’s approach seems to suggest that in light of a legitimate pro-competitive
justification, the Court would not even look into the competitive effects of the
conduct. The case law thus far suggests that the Chinese courts take a very lenient
approach toward vertical non-price restraint cases.
Another case in which a vertical agreement was implicated was the Shandong
Pharmaceutical case.134 It was an enforcement decision by the NDRC. In that
case, two distributors of pharmaceutical ingredients had signed an exclusive
127 Lianyungang Junmei Electronics v. Hong Bo, itlaws.com, (Lianyungang Intermediate People’s Court, 16
Dec. 2015).
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 两医药公司垄断复方利血平原料药受到严厉处罚 [Two Pharmaceutical Companies Severely
Punished for Monopolizing Market for Ingredients for Compound Reserpine Tablets] (NDRC, 15
Nov. 2011), http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201111/t20111115_444599.html.
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distribution agreement with the only two domestic manufacturers of a key
ingredient of an important hypertension drug respectively.135 The drug was listed
on the National Essential Drug Catalogue. Upon entry of the agreements, the
two distributors raised the price of the ingredient from between RMB 200 and
RMB 300 per kilo to RMB 1350 per kilo.136 Unable to bear the inflated price, a
number of the manufacturers ceased production of the hypertension drug, result-
ing in a shortage in the market.137 The NDRC found an infringement of the
AML without elaborating whether the exclusive distribution agreements without
what is obviously a cartel arrangement between the two distributors would be
deemed illegal. However, it is noteworthy that in addition to imposing fines, the
NDRC also required the two distributors to terminate their exclusive distribution
agreements.138 Two exclusive distribution agreements that account for the entire
market supply of a product would probably be highly problematic. The fact that
the NDRC required the termination of the distribution agreements suggests that
it held a similar view. But given the closely intertwined nature of the cartel and
the exclusive distribution agreements in the case, it is difficult to determine what
precisely is the NDRC’s view on the legality of exclusive distribution agree-
ments. Meanwhile, in the Guangdong Football case,139 the Supreme People’s
Court seems to suggest that exclusive dealing would only be dealt with as an
abuse of dominance and does not fall within the rubric of the monopolistic
agreement provisions of the AML. In fact, the Court seems to equate mono-
polistic agreements with horizontal agreements, which may be interpreted to
mean that Article 14 of the AML only applies to RPM. This would also seem
to be consistent with the decisional practices of the authorities.
4.2 RESTRICTION OF COMPETITION IN RPM CASES
Somewhat surprisingly, RPM has attracted a great deal of attention in AML
enforcement. After cartels, RPM accounts for the greatest number of enforcement
cases of which this author is aware. Moreover, RPM has resulted in very hefty
fines. Two of the three highest levels of fines imposed in a case came from RPM
cases, the Baby Formula case and the Moutai-Wuliangye case. The most elaborate
judicial opinion on monopolistic agreements has also been issued on RPM, the
Ruibang v. Johnson & Johnson case. Thus far, the NDRC has taken a fairly literal
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139 Guangdong Yuechao Sports Development Company v. Guangdong Football Association, Wolters Kluwer,
(Supreme People’s Court, 14 Dec. 2017).
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approach to the prohibition of RPM, eschewing detailed competitive effects
analysis and shunning pro-competitive justifications. The two Shanghai courts
that decided the Ruibang case both undertook detailed competitive effects analysis
and recognized pro-competitive justifications for RPM. Only time will tell how
this divide between the courts and the enforcement authorities will be resolved,
possibly in an administrative review lawsuit over an NDRC decision.
In the Ruibang case, the products at issue are suturing products used in
surgery.140 Ruibang had been a distributor of Johnson & Johnson’s suturing
products until it was terminated for failure to comply with the minimum resale
price stipulated by Johnson & Johnson.141 Ruibang brought suit, claiming damages
from the termination. The Shanghai Intermediate People’s Court No. 1 had ruled
in favour of Johnson & Johnson. It asserted that under Article 14 of the AML, it is
not sufficient to show that an RPM arrangement existed, it is necessary to show
that it restricted or eliminated competition in a relevant market.142 It listed three
factors to be considered for determining whether competition has been restricted,
including the market share of the product under the RPM arrangement, the level
of competition in the upstream and the downstream market, and the impact on the
product’s price and quantity exerted by the RPM arrangement.143 The court
proceeded to conclude that the plaintiff had failed to adduce evidence on these
three factors.144 On the contrary, the defendant was able to show that many other
suppliers existed for suturing products in the Mainland.145 The implicit conclusion
was a lack of market power on the part of Johnson & Johnson, which required
dismissal of the suit.
The Shanghai High People’s Court reversed the lower court. However, it
endorsed the effects-based approach adopted by the lower court. The court
affirmed that under Article 14, the plaintiff must show that an agreement restricts
or eliminates competition in order to sustain a finding of infringement.146 The
court reasoned that if Article 13, which applies to horizontal agreements, requires a
showing of restriction of competition to prove a violation, it is only natural that
the same requirement applies to Article 14, given that vertical agreements are less
likely to be anticompetitive.147 The court proceeded to outline four factors to be
considered in determining whether an RPM restricts competition: (1) whether
competition in the relevant market is sufficient, (2) whether the defendant
140 Ruibang v. Johnson & Johnson, Chinalawinfo.com (Shanghai High People’s Court, 1 Aug. 2013).
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possesses a strong market position, (3) what are the defendant’s motives for
imposing the RPM, and (4) what is the competitive impact of the RPM.148
These factors are slightly different from the factors identified by the lower court,
but both sets of factors emphasize the degree of competition in the relevant
market. The Shanghai High People’s Court is more sophisticated in its approach
in that it does not focus on market share, but on market position, which in the
analysis undertaken seems to refer to market power. A slight surprise on the list is
motives of the defendant. In modern competition law analysis, the defendant’s
intent or motives generally play very minor role in the analysis. However, the
court seemed to have used motives as a yardstick to predict the likely impact of the
RPM, which is to prevent a fall in prices.
The court proceeded to undertake very meticulous and thorough analysis of
the four factors to hold that the RPM scheme imposed by Johnson & Johnson
restricted competition. On the extent of competition in the relevant market, the
court stated that four factors are relevant: (1) the degree of concentration in the
relevant market, (2) substitutability of the product at issue, (3) entry barriers to the
relevant market, and (4) competitiveness of the downstream market.149 The court
began by defining the relevant market as that for suturing products in China.150
This market definition was uncontroversial in the case. The court examined both
demand substitutability and supply substitutability, concluding that due to unique-
ness of the products, demand substitutability is low and manufacturers of related
products would face significant difficulty switching to the production of suturing
products.151 The court declared that if a credible relevant market can be defined
based on demand substitutability and supply substitutability, there is no need to
resort to the hypothetical monopolist test.152
The court concluded that competition is insufficient in the suturing products
market for a variety of reasons. First, price elasticity of the product is low because
suturing products only account for a very small portion of surgical expenses and the
hospitals pass on the total costs of suturing products to patients.153 Moreover,
patients are highly reliant on hospitals for surgical services.154 The implication is
that hospitals are unlikely to be cost-sensitive to the prices of suturing products and
patients are highly unlikely to choose a hospital based on the prices of its suturing
products. Second, there is a high degree of brand loyalty, because suturing
products are an experience product. Johnson & Johnson has invested heavily to
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
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train doctors and nurses on the use of its products and thus healthcare professionals
have become highly reliant on them.155 They are hesitant to switch to unfamiliar
products. Third, there are high barriers to entry due to a variety of reasons.156 First,
regulatory requirements are stringent.157 Second, as mentioned earlier, brand
loyalty is high.158 Third, Johnson & Johnson has had long-standing relationships
with its customers.159 Fourth, the court was convinced that Johnson & Johnson
had a high degree of freedom to set prices in spite of its competitors.160 The court
noted that the prices for its products had remained largely the same over fifteen
years, despite the entry of many new products.161 This conclusion is admittedly
somewhat questionable given that whether the stability in price is indicative of
Johnson & Johnson’s price setting power would crucially depend on its competi-
tors’ prices. If its competitors’ prices were lower than Johnson & Johnson’s, then
the court’s conclusion is justified. But if the competitors’ prices were in fact higher
than Johnson & Johnson’s, then the stability of prices tells us nothing of Johnson &
Johnson’s price-setting power.
The court also concluded that Johnson & Johnson had a very strong market
position in the relevant market. The first controversy regarding market position/
power is Johnson & Johnson’s market share in the relevant market. Johnson &
Johnson had provided an estimation of its market share at 20.4% at the lower court
based on its own sales figures and statistics on the total use of suturing products
across China taken from an official almanac.162 In a move that perhaps can be
taken as reversing the burden of proof on market share – a move inconsistent with
other court cases which have consistently held that the plaintiff bears the burden to
provide market share information and evidence on market power – the Shanghai
court argued that Johnson & Johnson must possess information at its disposal to
arrive at an accurate estimation of its market share in China.163 The court based its
argument on the fact that Johnson & Johnson had calculated global market shares
for its suturing products, and inferred that if the company had sufficient informa-
tion to calculate global market shares, it must have the information to calculate
domestic market shares.164
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The court did not indicate how much higher than 20.4% would suffice to
indicate sufficient market power on the part of the defendant in an RPM case. The
only conclusions that can be drawn are that higher than 20.4% is sufficient and that
lower than 20.4% is probably insufficient. Otherwise the court would have con-
cluded that Johnson & Johnson had sufficient market share to constitute the
requisite market power based on that estimation alone. In other words, 20.4%
can be treated as a safe harbour in RPM cases. This conclusion leads to the
anomaly that conceivably 21% would constitute sufficient degree of market
power in an RPM case, but not so in a horizontal agreement case, as held by
the Guangdong High People’s Court in the Shenzhen Pest Control case.
In addition to market share, the court concluded that Johnson & Johnson held
a leading position in the relevant market. Again, in a move that can be construed as
reversing the burden of proof, the court held that in light of Johnson & Johnson’s
failure to provide market share statistics for its competitors, the lack of sufficient
competition in the domestic market, and the company’s leading position in the
global market, it can be inferred that the Johnson & Johnson held a leading
position in the domestic suturing products market.165 The court seemed to be
suggesting that having established that there is a lack of sufficient competition in
the domestic market and that the company holds a leading position globally, the
burden shifts to the defendant to provide market share statistics to rebut the
presumption that it holds a leading position domestically as well. The court further
emphasized that Johnson & Johnson held a very high market share with the leading
(three top) hospitals in China, which tended to have outsized competitive sig-
nificance in the domestic market, as they tended to influence the practices at
lower-tiered hospitals.166 Furthermore, the court inferred from Johnson &
Johnson’s high degree of price-setting power and its strong brand reputation that
it held a very strong market position.167
Lastly, the court asserted that the degree of control Johnson & Johnson had
over its distributors was also indicative of its strong market position.168 The court
noted that Johnson & Johnson required exclusivity of all its distributors, prohibit-
ing them from carrying competitors’ products.169 The rationale presumably is that
if Johnson & Johnson did not command a sufficient market share, the distributors
would not have agreed to exclusivity as they would not obtain sufficient business
from merely carrying Johnson & Johnson products.170 In addition, the distributors
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were also subject to territorial restrictions. A distributor must receive permission
from the company before it could sell to a hospital.171 The distributors were
also only given short-term distribution contracts, which to the court also gave
Johnson & Johnson additional leverage over its distributors.172
The court further held that the motive behind Johnson & Johnson’s RPM
scheme was to prevent price decreases. The court began its discussion by clarifying
that motives are relevant because it sheds light on the likelihood of anticompetitive
effects.173 If Johnson & Johnson intended to use the RPM scheme to restrict
competition, anticompetitive effects are more likely to materialize. The court
proceeded to infer from a number of contractual provisions that Johnson &
Johnson was very focused on preventing price competition. It commented that
when faced with an adverse competitive environment, it would rather respond by
strengthening customer relationships than by cutting prices.174 The court’s reason-
ing here is somewhat puzzling, because it is self-evident that a supplier is motivated
by a desire to prevent price decreases when imposing an RPM. Showing that the
defendant wants to prevent price decreases does not shed much light on the
anticompetitive nature of the conduct. The question is not whether this primary
motivation is present – it is present in every RPM case – but whether this
motivation is spurred by a secondary or ultimate desire to increase the competi-
tiveness of its products or by a desire to reap greater profit by exercising its market
power to prevent intra-brand competition. On this issue the court did not
approach it from a perspective of motivation, but from a perspective of effects.
The court proceeded to identify three anticompetitive effects of the RPM
scheme in the case. Importantly, the court did not simply identify these effects as
theoretical possibilities, it substantiated its claims with actual evidence from the
case. The court first declared that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the
RPM scheme facilitated a manufacturer cartel.175 However, the court concluded
that the RPM scheme reduced both intra-brand and inter-brand competition, and
prevented efficient distributors from benefiting from their efficiency.176 On intra-
brand competition, the court suggested that such competition is particularly
important for suturing products as hospitals tended to choose products first based
on quality and other considerations.177 Once they have selected a brand, they
expected to obtain the best price through competition among distributors.178 The
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fact that the plaintiff cut prices to compete for a tender showed that such intra-
brand competition would have taken place if Johnson & Johnson had allowed it.179
Moreover, there was plenty of room for price competition to take place within the
Johnson & Johnson brand as its products tended to be noticeably more costly than
other brands.
On inter-brand competition, the court noted that even though hospitals
tended to select brands based on non-price factors first, there was evidence that
inter-brand price competition did take place.180 The court noted a particular
instance where one hospital resisted a price increase by Johnson & Johnson and
the company eventually compromised with the customer and offered a lower
price.181 Therefore, customers are not completely price-insensitive. Moreover,
the court noted the plaintiff’s observation that when it lowered the price of its
Johnson & Johnson products, the price of other brands’ products dropped
correspondingly.182 The court thus concluded that with the RPM scheme,
Johnson & Johnson removed pressure of price competition from Johnson &
Johnson on other competing brands.183 Lastly, the court observed that the fact
that the plaintiff could reduce prices and still earn a profit shows that it was an
efficient distributor.184 Yet, it was prevented from competing based on its effi-
ciency in light of the RPM scheme.185
The court dismissed claims of procompetitive effects in the case as not
substantiated by evidence. The court acknowledged that product safety was parti-
cularly important for the products at issue, and accepted that the RPM scheme
would have been justified if it contributed to product safety.186 However, the
court dismissed this justification on the ground of lack of evidence. First, the court
observed that the defendant had failed to provide evidence that product safety had
improved as a result of the RPM scheme.187 The court also noted that none of the
responsibilities of the distributors, such as product promotion, provision of price
quotes, delivery of products, hospital visits, etc. were related to product safety.188
Two segments of the distribution chain which may allow distributors to contribute
to product safety, storage and transportation of the products, were not used by
distributors to improve product safety.189 Johnson & Johnson actually handled
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storage of the products itself and imposed no specific requirements on the trans-
portation of the products.190 The court further noted that the distributors had no
involvement in the two segments of the supply chain that were the most intimately
related to product safety, production and training of healthcare professionals.191
Johnson & Johnson was in charge of both activities. Therefore, it was clear that the
RPM scheme could not be justified by its contribution to product safety.
Second, the court dismissed prevention of free riding as a plausible justification
for the RPM scheme.192 This is largely because a distributor can only sell to a
particular hospital after authorization from Johnson & Johnson.193 And no hospitals
can obtain the suturing products from channels outside of the authorized
distributors.194 Moreover, the court believed that Johnson & Johnson exerted
very tight control over the distributors.195 There was really no room for the
distributors to shirk their obligations.
Third, while acknowledging that promotion of new products and establish-
ment of a new brand would justify the use of RPM, the court held that these two
justifications had no application in this case.196 Johnson & Johnson was a very well
established brand for suturing products in China and suturing products were by no
means new products.197
Lastly, the court rejected a range of other possible justifications for the RPM
scheme in the case. First, the court argued that there was no need for Johnson &
Johnson to use RPM to enhance brand reputation given the established brand
name of the company.198 Second, given the maturity of the product and the
stability of demand, there is no need to use RPM to encourage stocking of
inventory or to reduce market volatility.199 Third, given that distribution of
customers among distributors was completely dictated by Johnson & Johnson,
and the number and scale of the distributors was tightly controlled by the com-
pany, there was no need to use RPM to protect or expand the distribution
system.200 Fourth, given that the distributors were exclusive to Johnson &
Johnson, there was no need to use RPM to encourage them to focus their efforts
on the company’s products.201
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What is noteworthy in the court’s recognition of these justifications for RPM,
at least in theory, is that these justifications are not found in Article 15, which
provides for grounds for exempting agreements from Articles 13 and 14. The
implication would be that Article 15 does not provide an exhaustive list of
justifications for putative anticompetitive conduct and the courts may recognize
other defences as justified by the conduct and the circumstances.
It is unmistakable that the Shanghai courts have adopted what is essentially a
Rule of Reason analysis for RPM. The Shanghai High People’s Court expended
considerable effort to analyse the competitive effects of the RPM and the pro-
competitive justifications. Although the analysis was by no means perfect – there
were a few places in the opinion where the analysis was questionable – it was
highly sophisticated, displaying a high degree of familiarity with the intricacies of
the economics of RPM. For courts that had only begun to hear competition cases
in 2008, the effort was highly commendable. From the opinion, it is clear that the
court recognized that market power of the supplier is a basic consideration in
determining the legality of an RPM scheme. However, the court somewhat
artificially bifurcated the analysis by first assessing the competitiveness of the market
and then the supplier’s market position. And its focus on the motivations behind
the RPM scheme is arguably superfluous, if not somewhat misguided. What
impressed the most was the court’s analysis of the anticompetitive effects and
awareness of a wide range of procompetitive justifications for RPM. Unlike
many other judicial opinions, in which the discussion of competitive effects
remained in the abstract, the Shanghai court’s discussion was well substantiated
by evidence. The court also is to be commended for applying a critical approach to
procompetitive justifications, including prevention of free riding, which is often
claimed but seldom substantiated by evidence. In short, as far as the Chinese courts
are concerned, restriction of competition with respect to RPMs requires a close
analysis of actual competitive effects and the applicability of procompetitive
justifications.
The same cannot be said about the NDRC’s approach to RPM. The brevity
of the NDRC’s decisions and press releases makes it hard to assess accurately its
approach. Its approach probably falls somewhat short of a per se approach; the
NDRC has not declared that RPM is illegal because its falls within the literal
language of Article 14. There are some discussions of anticompetitive effects in its
press releases. However, there is hardly any evidence provided to substantiate its
claims of restriction of competition. The NDRC’s identification of restriction of
intra-brand and inter-brand competition in the Moutai-Wuliangye case and the
Baby Formula case probably can be applied to every RPM scheme. And in none
of the press releases was there a discussion of possible procompetitive justifica-
tions for RPM. Therefore, it is not clear yet whether NDRC recognizes any
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possible justifications for RPM. It is entirely possible that the NDRC’s approach
will evolve into something akin to a per se approach.
5 CONCLUSION
Given its relatively short history, the content of Chinese competition law is still
rapidly evolving. While the bulk of the decided cases have come from the
enforcement authorities, the relative brevity of their decisions and press releases
means that much remains unknown about the authorities’ precise approach to
various monopolistic agreements. Despite being fewer in number, judicial opinions
help to shed more light on how agreements are treated under the AML. At the
moment, it seems that there is an emerging consensus that cartel agreements are
illegal on their face. The Shenzhen Pest Control and the Badong Shenlong Travel
Agencies cases remain the notable exceptions. There have been no known public
enforcement or court cases involving non-cartel horizontal agreements under the
AML (the Beijing Locksmiths case was decided under the LAUC). Meanwhile, there
seems to be a split between the courts and the NDRC on their approach to RPM,
with the courts taking a more effects-based approach while the NDRC applies a
more literal prohibition. A continual split between the courts and the NDRC
would be undesirable as it could potentially lead to forum shopping and create
confusion in the law. On a more reassuring note, it seems that the notion of
restriction of competition that has been developed thus far under the AML is
largely consistent with the international consensus, although the Chinese courts
thus far seem to be particularly lenient with vertical non-price restraints. Whether
it will continue to be so remains to be seen.
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